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Abstract
As J. P. Spencer et al. (2009) argue, the theories of some developmental psychologists
continue to be nativistic, even though nativism is an inherently nondevelopmental school
of thought. Psychologists interested in development study the emergence of human
characteristics—including predispositions—and are not content to simply catalogue
competences that characterize human newborns; instead, they recognize that all human
characteristics, including those present at birth, reflect the circumstances of development.
A truly developmental science of behavior requires rejecting the nativism–empiricism
debate outright, abandoning ideas such as ‘‘core knowledge’’ and psychological
‘‘endowments,’’ and adopting a process perspective that focuses on how traits emerge
from the co-actions of biological and experiential factors. Unlike nativism, the process
perspective advocated by J. P. Spencer et al. encourages research that can reveal the
developmental origins of psychological characteristics of interest.
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Probing Predispositions: The Pragmatism of a Process Perspective
In “Short arms and talking eggs: Why we should no longer abide the nativistempiricist debate,” Spencer et al. (2009) criticize several constructs—e.g., “endowments,
primitives, core knowledge, essences”—that some psychologists employ in spite of
advances in developmental science suggesting they are not helpful. In particular, they
criticize Spelke & Kinzler (2007), who appear to seek middle ground in the empiricistnativist debate by arguing that the human mind is neither “a single general-purpose
learning system” nor made of “myriad special-purpose systems and predispositions,” but
rather is composed of “a small number of separable systems of core knowledge” (p. 89).
Although Spencer et al. frame their discussion as a reaction, in part, to Spelke &
Kinzler’s nativism, it is worth noting that Spelke & Kinzler do not explicitly use some of
the concepts that Spencer et al. find problematic. For example, Spencer et al. criticize the
nativist notion of “relevant experience,” but Spelke & Kinzler never use this concept
explicitly (and they use it implicitly only once, when discussing Valenza et al., 2006).
Likewise, Spelke & Kinzler do not explicitly label any behaviors “innate,” even though
nativists typically refer to at least some behaviors in this way. Nevertheless, Spencer et
al. have not created a straw man; the nativist conceptions that concern them characterize
the works of many psychologists, Spelke & Kinzler included. For example, despite
Spelke & Kinzler’s rejection of “single general-purpose” and “myriad special-purpose”
views of the mind, their claim that people are “endowed” with “separable systems of core
knowledge” clearly bears a close resemblance to the modern-nativist tenets that human
minds have been shaped by evolution (“endowed”) and are modular (“separable
systems”).

Probing Predispositions 2
Spelke & Kinzler reject evolutionary psychologists’ theories of massive
modularity, but their nativism is nonetheless evident in their notion of “core knowledge.”
It appears they consider knowledge systems to be “core” if they have phylogenetic roots
and can be detected in infants. Thus, they believe there is something special about
characteristics present in infancy; in fact, in an early paper on “core knowledge,” Spelke
(2000) wrote that cognitive systems that are “building blocks” for complex cognitive
skills “may be especially amenable to study in infants, where they appear in relatively
pure form” (p. 1241). However, the systems perspective increasingly favored by
developmentalists (Gottlieb, 2007; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Oyama, Griffiths, &
Gray, 2001) holds that traits that characterize infants are no more “pure” than other traits,
because all traits emerge from developmental processes. In contrast, the idea that traits
present in infancy provide privileged insight into “human nature” is quintessentially
nativistic.
Nativists typically assume neonatal characteristics are “pure” because newborns
have not had certain experiences1 (e.g., exposure to patterned light). However, a
discovery indicating that a competence develops even without particular experiential
input cannot support positive claims about the competence’s origins. As Lehrman (1953)
realized a half-century ago, we cannot infer that a competence is “innate” just because it
develops in the absence of particular experiences; at best, such findings illuminate which

1

Surprisingly, Spelke & Kinzler (2007) argue that 3-month-olds’ “visual preference for members of their
own race” (p. 92) reflects the operation of a “core knowledge system,” even though this bias requires
specific experiences to develop. Consequently, it is not clear why the early appearance of such a bias
renders it “core”; other psychological traits—the ability to read, for example—emerge after exposure later
in life to particular stimuli, but no one argues that such traits somehow signal “core” knowledge.
Furthermore, the idea that racial biases have “evolutionary roots” is unsubstantiated in this paper, other
than by reference to the speculative musings of some evolutionary psychologists. Without well-defined
criteria for designating “knowledge systems” as “core,” it is unclear why we should think racial biases are
any more “core” than biases without phylogenetic roots or early appearances in infancy.
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experiential factors do not contribute to its development. The question of which
experiential factors do contribute remains unanswered without further developmental
analysis. Although intuition suggests that experience with patterned light should
influence object-boundary perception, for example, we cannot know which experiential
factors are influential before probing development; as Spencer et al. note, characteristics
often develop only after organisms have particular experiences not obviously relevant to
the characteristics’ development.
If a competence or predisposition is found in infancy, scientists with a genuinely
developmental orientation ask “from whence did this competence or predisposition
emerge?” Among the things developmentalists do not conclude from such discoveries are
a) that the competence or predisposition was pre-specified—in the genome or anywhere
else—in a way that allowed it to develop independently of the context in which it
emerged, b) that it is an “endowment” indicative of a particular phylogenetic history, or
c) that it has some privileged “core” status relative to later-developing abilities (the
ability to read, for example) that other skills or beliefs can be built on. Developmentalists
refrain from the latter conclusions because they are mere speculations. They refrain from
the first conclusion because human characteristics never emerge independently of
developmental circumstances. Among the most important discoveries of modern
developmental science has been the finding that genes are expressed in epigenetic
contexts that profoundly influence development (Harper, 2005; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005;
Weaver et al., 2007) and that species-typical brain structures, likewise, often reflect the
contexts—both pre- and post-natal—in which development occurs (Johnson, 2005).
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Developmentally-oriented scientists are interested not in the number or nature of
human predispositions, but in their origins, because like all characteristics,
predispositions must develop; they cannot be genetically specified or emerge
independently of development (Moore, 2001). Even cross-cultural or cross-species
universals like Spelke & Kinzler’s “endowments” develop, via processes that are
dynamic and interactive (Thelen & Smith, 1994). This insight spurs researchers to probe
the process by which predispositions (or competences or any other traits) develop. Thus,
process approaches are pragmatic; they encourage research on a predisposition’s origins,
which could reveal how to influence its development. In contrast, claims that infants are
born with a predisposition seem to answer a question about origins, but they actually do
not. Identifying early-appearing proclivities and labeling them “core”—a designation
implying they are somehow ‘atomic’ and not subject to further analysis—effectively
short-circuits developmental investigation, halting the scientific pursuit of understanding
(Lehrman, 1953). The value of a process approach was obvious to embryologist Wilhelm
His 120 years ago, when he wrote:
“...The single word ‘heredity’ cannot dispense science from the duty of
making every possible inquiry into the mechanism of organic growth…To
think that heredity will build organic beings without mechanical means is a
piece of unscientific mysticism...A direct explanation…[of trait emergence]
can only come from the immediate study of the different phases of individual
development…” (His, 1888, p. 295).
The same could be written of the words “endowed” or “core.”
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Thus, the real insight of developmental science has been the realization that the
empiricist-nativist debate cannot be resolved by agreeing that the truth lies somewhere
between poles staked out by empiricists and nativists; instead, developmental research
indicates that the debate itself should be rejected outright, as a conversation generated in
response to a poorly formed question, namely, whether human nature is learned or
inherited. Focusing on developmental origins reveals that traits develop from complex
interactions involving the participation of factors—including both genetic and nongenetic factors operating at all levels of organization—that cannot be understood in terms
of older conceptions of inheritance or learning. Developmental systems theorists have
discovered that experiences often influence development in ways that bear little
resemblance to well-characterized modes of learning, and that organisms “inherit” from
their ancestors both biological and non-biological contributors to development (Oyama et
al., 2001). Consequently, Spencer et al.’s (2009) concerns about claims that appear to
resolve the empiricist-nativist debate are justifiable.
Spencer et al. effectively critique nativism, but they do not embrace empiricism;
they never argue that evolutionary accounts are valueless in attempts to explain human
cognition or that “a single learning system” can explain all psychological phenomena.
Instead, they reject the empiricism-nativism debate entirely. But unlike Spelke & Kinzler,
who claim to seek resolution while still promulgating nativism, Spencer et al. reject the
debate by suggesting we stop asking whether or not experiences contribute to
development, and ask instead how traits emerge from the co-actions of the biological and
experiential factors that together comprise the complex developmental systems we are.
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